Supported resource fields
Sessionresources currently accepts timeout_seconds and idle_timeout_seconds, not arbitrary CPU/memory fields. Timeout is 60–3600 seconds, default 600; idle is 15–3600, default 60. Effective idle eligibility is capped at timeout minus ten seconds. Provider templates, sizes, and quotas belong to the relevant Sandbox connection schema.
Do not interpret timeout as identical wall-clock billing behavior across Providers. Persistent-resource deadlines and suspension strategies differ; see lifecycle semantics.
Preflight an allowlist
credential_host / credentialHost must be the hostname of the current protected credential ingress URL, without scheme, port, or path. Replace the illustrative target domain with your authorized destination.
network_policy_unsupported. Missing credential ingress produces credential_proxy_not_allowed_by_network_policy. Do not silently fall back to unrestricted networking. Recheck policy if a temporary ingress hostname changes.
Know which layer enforces what
Sandbox egress policy constrains the cloud environment. Tool operation selection constrains business actions. Protected model/HTTP bindings constrain control-plane proxy destinations. Tool requests can originate in the control plane, so Sandbox allowlists do not establish filtering of every Tool destination.required_capabilities requests capabilities; it does not grant new ones to adapters. Preflight also checks Harness/model protocols, Tools, initialization, and OCI compatibility. The combination’s verification.status is currently unverified: preflight is not a fresh cloud acceptance run.
Account for every required destination
Build the allowlist from the actual execution path: protected credential ingress, Harness installation/download endpoints where applicable, package sources needed by the project, and authorized task destinations. The model upstream may be contacted by the control plane through protected access; adding only that upstream hostname does not replace the Sandbox’s need to reach credential ingress. The ingress check currently requires the exact hostname in the list, not a URL or a presumed wildcard match. Keep the distinction between control-plane preflight and Provider-specific hostname semantics. Preflight does not test DNS resolution, redirects, registry downloads or enforcement against an unlisted destination. A project can pass structural preflight and then fail installing dependencies because a required host is blocked. Diagnose the denied destination before changing policy; do not silently switch to unrestricted mode to make a tutorial pass. Use a two-sided probe with destinations you control or are authorized to access. Confirm the denied destination is reachable from a permitted comparison environment; otherwise a timeout may only indicate a dead endpoint. Record where the probe ran, the effective policy, connection/version, request outcome and cleanup. A DNS failure or proxy failure alone is not sufficient evidence of the intended policy boundary. If a temporary credential-ingress hostname changes, reassess existing Sessions’ pinned allowlists and create new Sessions where the intended policy differs. A newly passing preflight does not modify an existing Session. Preserve old resources for reconciliation until cleanup is confirmed.Verify live enforcement
From a supported dedicated Sandbox, probe an allowed destination and a disallowed destination. Confirm success and rejection respectively, plus working model credential access. Record real observations and exact Provider/Harness versions. Accepted JSON alone does not prove enforcement. Distinguish invalid schema, unsupported capability, blocked ingress, quota, and transport faults. Retain resource identifiers and confirm cleanup. Sources: request schema, compatibility resolver. Next: Tools, recovery.Read an actual allowed/denied probe
The November 15 public API network journey used the TypeScript SDK and normal worker to run a deterministic registered Harness inside real E2B Sandboxes. With unrestricted networking, bothexample.com and example.org returned HTTP 200. With the documented allowlist, example.com returned 200 while example.org returned HTTP 000 and curl exit 35. The unchanged probe bypassed proxy environment variables to measure Sandbox egress; it exported its observations and confirmed both resource deletions.
That paired baseline supports the recorded allow/deny conclusion; exit 35 by itself would only identify a TLS/connect failure. The Harness did not call a model. This record does not prove current Pi model access, Python parity, every hostname/IP/IPv6/wildcard behavior or exhaustive bypass resistance. Use current Sandbox capabilities and the initialization contract when choosing today’s combination; keep unsupported preflight rejection separate from actual network enforcement evidence.
Next: Sandbox capabilities, capabilities and evidence, configuration reference. Provider details: Sandbox integration contract.